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Abstract
People often use expert advice when making decisions in our society, but how we are influenced by this advice has yet to
be understood. To address this, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we provided expert and novice advice to
participants during an estimation task. Participants reported that they valued expert advice more than novice advice, and
activity in the ventral striatum correlated with this valuation, even before decisions with the advice were made. When using
advice, participants compared their initial opinion to their advisor’s opinion. This comparison, termed the ‘‘opinion
difference’’, influenced advice utilization and was represented in reward-sensitive brain regions. Finally, the left lateral
orbitofrontal cortex integrated both the size of the opinion difference and the advisor’s level of expertise, and average
activity in this area correlated with mean advice utilization across participants. Taken together, these findings provide neural
evidence for how advice engenders behavioral change during the decision-making process.
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Introduction
Many important decisions are made while under the influence
of expert advice, from a politician receiving counsel when deciding
whether to raise taxes, to a cancer patient being advised by their
doctor when deciding whether to undergo chemotherapy. Advice
is also valuable to us; we give it such high regard that billions of
dollars change hands every year to receive counsel [1]. These
recommendations could come in the form of guidance on
corporate strategy from a top consulting firm, or suggestions on
personal money management from a financial expert. Further-
more, in the real world the level of expertise of advisors varies;
decision makers encounter people with in-depth knowledge who
can provide high quality advice, as well as less-informed people
providing advice of a lesser quality. With advice taking playing
such an important role in our society, especially the role of expert
advice in our economy, surprisingly little is understood about how
we integrate, and are influenced by, information from advisors
with different levels of expertise.
Here, we conceptualized advice-taking as consisting of three
cognitive processes: (1) the valuation of advice, (2) the assessment
of the ‘‘opinion difference’’ (i.e., the comparison between an
advisor’s opinion and one’s own opinion), and (3) the process of
combining valuation and the opinion difference resulting in actual
advice utilization. Regarding the first process, the valuation of
advice, it is well-established that people use advice from experts to
a greater degree than advice from novices [2–4]. One possible
explanation for the strong influence of expert advice is that people
value it more than novice advice, even before they actually make
a decision and discover the outcome of this decision. Therefore,
we hypothesized that the same brain areas that represent value
when receiving money and objects, such as the ventral striatum
and orbitofrontal cortex [5–7], also represent value when people
discover they will be receiving either expert or novice advice.
Second, we hypothesized that when people receive an advisor’s
opinion they compare it to their initial opinion. We call this
comparison an ‘‘opinion difference’’. The opinion difference is
used in judging whether or not, or to what degree, a person is
influenced by the advice [8]. For example, if an advisor’s opinion
is similar to a person’s initial opinion, the opinion difference is low
and the person uses the advice more. Conversely, if an advisor’s
opinion disagrees with a person’s initial opinion, the opinion
difference is high and the person is less influenced by the advice.
Because advice is commonly used when making goal-oriented
decisions where people try to obtain rewards or avoid punish-
ments, we theorized that the change in neural activity due to the
opinion difference occurs in previously established reward-
sensitive areas such as the ventral striatum, amygdala, anterior
cingulate gyrus, ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the orbito-
frontal cortex [5–7,9–11]. Our analysis of neuroimaging data
reflected this a priori hypothesis (see Methods).
Finally, regarding the process of combining valuation and the
opinion difference, we aimed to identify a region of the brain
where neural activity represents the behavioral influence of advice.
Activity in this area should fulfill two conditions. One, when
a person receives advice, the neural signal within this area should
reflect the consideration of the size of the opinion difference and
the expertise level of the advisor relative to each other. For
example, a person experiencing a large opinion difference when
receiving advice from an expert may react differently compared to
experiencing a large opinion difference when receiving advice
from a novice. This difference in reaction when receiving expert
versus novice advice may not hold when that person experiences
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a small opinion difference. In other words, there should be an
interaction between the expertise level of an advisor and the size of
the opinion difference. Two, the average activity in this brain area
should correlate with the behavioral influence of advice at the
individual level. Specifically, different people should perform this
comparison to different degrees, which should result in individual
differences in advice utilization.
There have been three previous neuroimaging studies concern-
ing aspects of advice taking. These studies did not address the
above-outlined cognitive processes, but rather focused on com-
paring decision making with or without advice, or examining
neural activity when learning the outcome of decisions made with
advice [12–14]. There have also been several neuroimaging
studies which examined conformity to others, which is related to
the social influence of explicit advice [15–17]. Furthermore, one
study also examined the expertise of celebrities and its implicit
influence on attitudes and memory of objects [18]. Here, we
focused on the not yet investigated differences between utilizing
explicit expert and novice advice, and on understanding brain
activity at the time when people receive and utilize advice.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the local ethics committee at the
Freie Universitaet Berlin, Germany. The study was carried out in
accordance to the Declaration of Helsinki. Informed written
consent was obtained from each subject before the study.
Participants
We recruited 29 healthy, right-handed participants (12 male)
between 20 and 30 years of age (mean=23.3, SD=2.8). All
participants had no history of psychiatric or neurological disorder.
German was the native language of all participants. Relevant to
the experimental paradigm, no participant had previous experi-
ence renting apartments in New York City, or previous work
experience in the real estate industry.
Experimental Cover Story
Participants were told that they would be estimating the
monthly rental price of apartments in New York City for
a monetary reward. Furthermore, they were told that during the
task they would encounter three different situations: 1. They would
receive advice on the monthly rental price from an expert. This
expert advice would be randomly selected from the suggestions for
each apartment given by one of ten New York City real estate
agents. 2. They would receive advice on the monthly rental price
from a novice (‘‘Laie’’ in German). This novice advice would be
randomly selected from the suggestions for each apartment given
by one of ten people similar to the participants, without experience
in the New York City real estate market. Participants were told
that these novices received the same training as the participants
(see Procedure). Importantly, participants believed all advice was
well-intentioned; they were told that the advisors, both experts and
novices, were paid for how close their advice was to the real rental
price. This removed the potentially confounding effect of
trustworthiness on the expertise of advisors. 3. They would not
receive advice. When participants encountered this no advice
situation they were asked to ‘‘think again’’ about their estimate on
the monthly rental price of an apartment. In order to motivate
them to think again when not receiving advice, participants were
told that research shows that people who think again and revise
their initial opinion increase their accuracy [19].
Participants were paid 10 Euro for taking part in the study and
were told that the accuracy of their estimates would be ascertained
after the task. From the 120 trials, 8 would be randomly selected (4
from their first estimates and 4 from their second estimates, see
Procedure) to be compared to the real rental price of the
apartments. Participants were told they would receive 2 Euro if
their estimate was within 100 Euro from the actual rental price, or
1 Euro if their estimate was between 101 and 300 Euro away from
the actual price. Thus, participants had the potential to win an
additional 16 Euro.
Stimuli
Descriptions and price information of real apartments offered
for rent in New York City were obtained from www.streeteasy.
com (September 2010), a website which aggregates apartment
listings. One hundred and thirty-three apartments (120= experi-
mental stimuli set, 10 = first training session set, 3 = second
training session set; see Procedure) were selected as stimuli from
a database of 6,062, and four attributes of each apartment were
presented to participants in German: 1. Square meters (converted
from square feet), 2. Number of rooms, 3. Number of bathrooms,
and 4. Neighborhood. Neighborhood was an index of quality that
ranged from 1 to 3. Neighborhoods were ordered according to
average price per square meter and then divided into thirds. If the
neighborhood of a specific apartment was in the lower third of the
average price per square meter ranking, it was assigned to
Neighborhood 1, if in the middle third it was placed into
Neighborhood 2, and if in the top third it was placed into
Neighborhood 3.
Apartments in the stimuli set ranged in price from 799 to 3188
Euro (mean= 1963.8, SD =612.8; converted from dollars), in
square meters from 14 to 139 (mean= 60.2, SD=22.7), in number
of rooms from 1 to 6 (mean= 2.83, SD=1.1), in number of
bathrooms from 1 to 2 (mean= 1.1, SD=0.3), and as mentioned
above, in neighborhood index from 1 to 3 (mean= 1.98, SD=0.8).
A linear regression was performed on all 133 apartments used in
the experiment and training sessions. All 4 attributes significantly
predicted the monthly rental price of the apartment
(F(4,128) = 101.568, p,0.001; square meters p,0.001, number of
rooms p= 0.013, bathrooms p= 0.007, neighborhood p,0.001).
In order for each participant to receive an even distribution of
attributes and apartment values across each of the 3 experimental
conditions (see Procedure), the 120 stimuli were divided into 3
groups of 40. Each group of apartments was then assigned to
a single experimental condition for each participant, counter-
balanced across participants. Between the three groups of
apartments, there was no difference in apartment price
(F(2,117) = 0.474, p= 0.624), square meters (F(2,117) = 0.105,
p = 0.901), number of rooms (F(2,117) = 0.132, p = 0.876), number
of bathrooms (F(2,117) = 0.084, p = 0.919), or neighborhood index
(F(2,117) = 0.051, p = 0.950).
Procedure
Before scanning, each participant was given two training
sessions. The first was to educate the participant on the actual
prices of apartments in New York City, and the second was to
acclimate them to the actual task procedure. In the first training
session, which consisted of ten trials, participants saw a description
of an apartment and were asked to estimate the monthly rental
price. Participants were then shown the real rental price of the
apartment as listed on streeteasy.com. In the second training
session, participants practiced the actual experimental task for
three trials, one for each experimental condition (expert advice,
novice advice, no advice). All participants received the same
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apartments as stimuli for training presented in random order, and
apartments used in the training sessions were not used as stimuli in
the actual experiment.
The experimental task conducted in the MRI scanner is
depicted in Figure 1. At the start of each trial participants were
presented with a fixation cross, above which was written ‘‘New
trial’’. This lasted for 3 to 8 s (display times of this fixation cross
followed an exponential distribution with most display times at the
lower end of the range). Participants were next shown a description
of a real New York City apartment and asked to estimate the
monthly rental price within a time frame of 8.5 s. On the display
in each trial, the starting amount of their estimate was 2000 Euro
and participants used three buttons with a triangular spatial
arrangement to adjust and confirm their estimate. They pressed
left to decrease the amount, right to increase the amount, and the
button at the top of the triangle to confirm their estimate. When
the estimate was entered, a Euro symbol (J) appeared next to the
amount. When the 8.5 s expired, participants saw a fixation cross
for 2 s, followed by a display revealing who their advisor would be,
if any. The display told them either: 1. The person is an expert, 2.
The person is a novice, or 3. There will be no advice. This advisor
information was revealed for 2.5 s, after which, another fixation
cross was presented for 3 to 8 s (also following an exponential
distribution). After this delay, participants had 7 s in which they
were shown the advice amount, as well as the amount they entered
as their first estimate, and allowed to make a second and final
estimate. If participants were in the no advice condition they saw
‘‘xxxx’’ in the place of the numbers. Participants did not receive
feedback on the accuracy of their estimations during the
experiment to inhibit learning about the rental market and the
quality of advice. This allowed for the emulation of one-time
decision making situations where people do not have the
opportunity to track advice quality from repeated interactions
with an advisor. Participants needed to rely upon the reputation of
the advisor that was provided to them, either expert or novice.
Importantly, all advice that participants received was the actual price of
the apartment. Thus, the only difference between the expert and
novice conditions was the belief state of the participant that they
were receiving advice from an expert or a novice.
After scanning, participants were asked to rate the value of each
source of advice independently. They were asked, ‘‘Overall, how
valuable was the advice you received from the expert/novice?’’
Participants were asked to respond on a Likert scale from 1 to 5,
higher number denoting higher value. After responding to these
questions, participants were debriefed about the experiment.
Behavioral Analysis
All behavioral analyses were performed using repeated
measures ANOVA unless otherwise indicated (see Figure 2). For
each trial an ‘‘opinion difference’’ term was calculated as the
absolute difference between the advice amount and the partic-
ipant’s first estimate:
opinion difference~ Dadvice{ initial opinionD ð1Þ
For each participant, trials were classified according to the size of
the opinion difference. Specifically, in each advice condition
(expert and novice), trials were rank ordered by the size of the
opinion difference and a median split was performed, separating
trials into two groups, high opinion difference and low opinion
difference.
The amount of advice utilization was quantified by calculating
a weight of advice index (WOA) [2,20]:
WOA~ second opinion initial opinionð Þ=
advice initial opinionð Þ
ð2Þ
Importantly, we did not take the absolute value of this amount
as previously done in the literature. A negative WOA indicates
that participants moved away from the advice and we believe this
is different behavior from moving towards the advice. Brain
activity for these two behaviors would reflect this, thus we did not
treat them equally in our neuroimaging analysis.
For an example of how this WOA calculation translates into an
index of advice influence, assume two situations, both in which
a participant’s initial opinion was 1000 Euro and the advice was
2000 Euro. In the first situation, at the time of receiving the
advice, the participant may choose to adjust her estimate slightly
to 1100 Euro. As a result, the weight of advice index would be
calculated as 0.1. In the second situation, the participant may fully
use the advice and adjust her estimate to 2000 Euro. As a result
the calculated weight of advice index would be 1.
Trials in which participants displayed unusual reaction times
were excluded from analysis. To do this, the log of all reaction
times for the second estimate was calculated and times outside 2.5
standard deviations from a participant’s individual mean were
selected for exclusion. The mean number of trials removed for
each participant was 0.59 (SD=0.63), the maximum removed for
a participant was 2 trials. To assure that brain data were properly
interpreted, other trials were removed from analysis. First, trials in
which participants did not enter an estimate in either the first or
second estimate were removed. Next, trials in which the WOA was
zero were removed as well. This was done to achieve the goal of
the study, which was to assess the influence of advice and not the
decision of whether or not to use advice. If trials where the WOA
was zero were included with trials in which participants decided to
utilize advice to a certain degree, it would add a confound to the
neuroimaging results because a different cognitive process may
occur when the WOA is zero compared to even the smallest
amount of advice utilization. Last, trials in which the WOA was
greater than 1.3 were also removed. In these trials the participant’s
second estimate was a large distance away from the advice
amount. If these trials were left in the analysis they would be
considered trials in which participants were highly influenced by
the advice and this would be incorrect. To illustrate this point,
please consider another two situations in which a participant’s first
opinion was 1000 Euro and the advice was 2000 Euro. In the first
situation, the participant may choose to adjust her opinion to 2100
Euro, and the resulting WOA would be 1.1. In the second
situation, the participant may choose to adjust her opinion to 3100
Euro, and the resulting WOA would be 2.1. Although it is clear
that in the second situation the participant’s second opinion is far
from the advice and the participant was not as influenced by the
advice compared to the first situation, this would not have been
interpreted properly in the data because the 2.1 would have been
coded as a trial where the advice was more influential than the 1.1.
In order to stop this from happening, we removed all trials where
the WOA was above 1.3. To summarize, for our analysis we
excluded unanswered trials, trials with aberrant reaction times,
and answered trials that had a WOA of zero or a WOA above 1.3.
As a reminder, we included negative WOA trials (see above).
Overall, this resulted in an average of 59.6 trials (SD=11.6)
remaining from the initial 80 trials per participant in the expert
and novice conditions combined.
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fMRI Data Acquisition
Scanning was performed at the Dahlem Institute for Neuroima-
ging of Emotion at the Freie Universita¨t Berlin, Germany using
a 3T Siemens Trio scanner (Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics
GmbH) and Siemens head coil. Stimuli were presented using the
Cogent 2000 toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php)
for MATLAB (The Mathworks Inc.) on LCD-goggles (Resonance
Technology Inc.). Anatomical images were acquired using a T1-
weighted MPRage protocol (2566256 matrix, 176 sagittal slices of
1 mm thickness). Fieldmaps were acquired using a dual echo 2D
gradient echo sequence with echos at 4.92 and 7.38 ms, and
a repetition time of 488 ms. Functional images were acquired as
echo-planar T2*-weighted images (repetition time= 2.0 s, echo
time= 30 ms, matrix = 64664, flip angle = 70u, field of
view= 192 mm). A total of 37 contiguous oblique-axial slices
(36363 mm voxels) parallel to the anterior commissure-posterior
commissure line were collected per volume. A total of 434 volumes
were collected per experimental run, with 4 runs per participant.
fMRI Data Analysis
FMRIB Software Library [21] (FSL, version 4.1.7) was used for
fMRI data analysis on the High-Performance Computing system
at Freie Universita¨t Berlin (http://www.zedat.fu-berlin.de/
Compute). Brain matter in the T1-weighted anatomical image
was segmented from non-brain using a mesh deformation
approach [22]. Functional data were preprocessed using FSL
default options: motion correction was applied using rigid body
registration to the central volume [23]; Gaussian spatial smoothing
was applied with a full-width half-maximum of 6 mm; high-pass
temporal filtering was applied using a Gaussian-weighted running
lines filter, with a cut-off of 100 seconds. Susceptibility-related
distortions were corrected as far as possible using FSL fieldmap
correction routines [24].
To address our hypotheses concerning the valuation of advice,
the assessment of the opinion difference, and a region of the brain
representing the behavioral influence of advice, a general linear
model was fit to the data with the following 14 regressors:
– R1. For the periods of first estimation in the task.
Figure 1. Experimental task. Participants had 8.5 s to estimate the real monthly rental price of an apartment in New York City by using four
attributes (square meters, number of rooms, number of bathrooms, neighborhood). They then discovered the expertise level of their advisor (Time 1;
2.5 s). After a short delay, participants were then given advice on the rental price and allowed to adjust their answer (Time 2; 7 s).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049748.g001
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For the periods when the advisor was revealed in the task (Time
1):
– R2. An expert advisor was revealed.
– R3. A novice advisor was revealed.
– (R2 & R3 were used in the contrast for Figure 3A)
– R4. It was revealed that advice would not be given.
For the periods of second estimation in the task (Time 2):
– R5. Participants received expert advice with a low opinion
difference.
– R6. Participants received expert advice with a high opinion
difference.
– R7. Participants received novice advice with a low opinion
difference.
– R8. Participants received novice advice with a high opinion
difference.
– (R5–R8 were used in the contrasts for Figures 3B,C and
Figures 4 & 5)
– R9. Participants received expert advice, modulated by the
WOA for that trial. This regressor was orthogonalized to R5
and R6.
Figure 2. Behavioral data illustrating the utilization of advice. (A) Participants used expert advice more than novice advice (p,0.001).
Important to note, all advice that participants received, from both experts and novices, was the actual price of the apartment (see Materials and
Methods). Participants also used advice significantly more when the advice amount was close to their first estimate (low opinion difference)
compared to when the advice was far from their first estimate (high opinion difference) (p = 0.017). (B) Histogram of individual differences in usage of
advice with respect to expertise (mean expert WOA minus mean novice WOA). Participants demonstrated variability in their usage of advice from
different sources. Notably however, all of the participants used expert advice qualitatively more than novice advice (no participants below zero). (C)
Participants exhibited shorter reaction times when using expert advice than when using novice advice (p,0.001). They also responded more quickly
when the opinion difference was high compared to when the opinion difference was low (p= 0.039). (D) After the experiment, participants rated the
expert advice as being more valuable than the novice advice (scale from 1= low to 5 = high; p,0.001). Error bars represent standard error of the
mean. All analyses performed using repeated measures ANOVA unless otherwise indicated. OD = opinion difference.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049748.g002
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– R10. Participants received novice advice, modulated by the
WOA for that trial. This regressor was orthogonalized to R7
and R8.
– R11. Participants made a second estimation without receiving
advice.
– R12. Participants received advice but did not use it (WOA=0).
Finally, two nuisance regressors captured:
– R13. Subjects’ button presses to model motor activity.
– R14. Error trials (see exclusions in Behavioral Analysis).
Durations of stimuli were computed by calculating actual on-
screen time of stimuli (8.5 s for first estimate, 2.5 s for the revealing
of the advisor, and 7 s for second estimate). The duration of motor
activity was calculated from the first button press to the last. All
regressors were convolved with the FSL default (gamma)
hemodynamic response function. To note, our model contains
two regressors at the time point where participants utilized advice
(Time 2) that were modulated by the weight of advice on a trial-
by-trial basis (R9, R10). R9 modeled trials in which participants
received expert advice, and R10 modeled trials in which
participants received novice advice. These regressors were
orthogonalized with respect to the main effect regressors (see list
above). The goal of including these regressors was to capture any
additional, specifically linear parametric variance that was not
already modeled in the unmodulated regressors. Analysis with
these modulated regressors did not yield significant, reportable
results. Individual contrast images were computed and taken to
a group-level mixed-effect analysis using voxel-wise one-sample t-
tests (see below).
To address our first hypothesis, to reveal BOLD signal changes
representing the valuation of advice from different sources, we
contrasted regressors at the time point (Time 1) when participants
discovered they would be receiving expert or novice advice (R2.
R3; see Figure 3A). Furthermore, to determine brain regions
involved in utilizing expert or novice advice, we contrasted
regressors at the time point (Time 2) when participants utilized
advice and grouped the regressors by expertise level (R5+ R6.
R7+ R8; see Figure 3B). Z-statistic images were thresholded with
default FSL cluster correction for multiple comparisons with
a minimum Z-score set at 2.3 and a significance level set at
p,0.05. Parameter estimates were extracted by contrasting
indicated regressors against baseline (R5, R6, R7, R8; see
Figure 3C).
To address our second hypothesis, to reveal BOLD signal
changes representing the comparison of the participants’ initial
opinion and the advice, we contrasted regressors at the time point
(Time 2) when participants received advice and grouped the
regressors by the size of the opinion difference (R6+ R8. R5+ R7;
and reverse contrast; see Figures 4A, C). Importantly, advice is
commonly used when making goal-oriented decisions where
people try to maximize reward and/or minimize punishment. In
our task, we emulated this by providing a monetary incentive to
participants, where they believed they would be rewarded for the
accuracy of their estimations. Therefore, when participants made
their first estimate and then discovered the advice amount, they
calculated an opinion difference that was directly related to the
probability that they would receive a reward, depending on how
much they valued the advice source. For example, if the
participant valued the advice source and found out there was
a high opinion difference, then they would think their estimate
needs revision in order to obtain a reward. This demonstrates the
direct relation of the opinion difference to reward. Furthermore,
prior behavioral research has shown that advice discounting is
affected by monetary reward [3,20,25]. If the size of the monetary
reward affects the weight of advice, it could be that calculation of
the opinion difference, which occurs during the only instance that
participants receive information from their advisors, is reflected in
reward areas. Therefore, due to the above two lines of reasoning,
we hypothesized that the opinion difference would be calculated
by brain regions that have previously been established to be
reward-sensitive, such as the ventral striatum, amygdala, anterior
cingulate gyrus, ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the orbito-
frontal cortex [5–7,9–11]. For analysis of neuroimaging data
related to the opinion difference, we created a region of interest
mask of these reward-sensitive areas. Regions were defined by the
Harvard-Oxford anatomical atlas (75% minimum probability
threshold, 2 mm resolution): bilateral nucleus accumbens, bilateral
caudate, bilateral putamen, bilateral amygdala, anterior cingulate
Figure 3. Brain regions showing a main effect between the expert and novice condition. (A) When contrasting expert . novice at Time 1,
participants showed greater changes in BOLD signal in the ventral striatum upon discovering that their advisor will be an expert compared to
discovering that their advisor will be a novice. (B) When contrasting expert. novice at Time 2, participants showed greater changes in BOLD signal in
the medial prefrontal cortex when using advice from experts compared to using advice from novices. (C) Parameter estimates in the medial
prefrontal cortex at Time 2. Bars indicate standard error of the mean. BOLD activation maps thresholded at Z.2.3, p,0.05, cluster corrected. L = left,
OD = opinion difference, PFC = prefrontal cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049748.g003
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cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex. These
regions in the atlas did not cover all reward-related areas and gaps
remained at the anterior/medial prefrontal cortex and the
ventral/lateral orbitofrontal cortex. Thus, these areas were drawn
in manually from the ventral paracingulate gyrus and the ventral/
anterior frontal pole regions in the atlas. The resulting mask was
then smoothed using a mean-filtered kernel of 3.5 mm. To reveal
BOLD signal changes concerning the opinion difference using this
region of interest mask, Z-statistic images were thresholded using
false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple comparisons
with a significance level set conservatively at p,0.01. Parameter
estimates were extracted by contrasting indicated regressors
against baseline (R5, R6, R7, R8; see Figures 4B, D).
To address our third hypothesis, that there is a region of the
brain where neural activity represents the behavioral influence of
advice, we performed an interaction contrast at the time point
(Time 2) when participants received advice ((R6. R5) . (R8.
R7); see Figure 5A). Because of the involvement of the opinion
difference in the contrast, we used the above-described region of
interest mask to reveal BOLD signal changes. Z-statistic images
were thresholded using false discovery rate (FDR) correction for
multiple comparisons with a significance level set conservatively at
p,0.01. Parameter estimates were extracted by contrasting




Behavioral data revealed that participants used expert advice
more than novice advice as demonstrated by the weight of advice
index (F(1,28) = 77.531, p,0.001; Figure 2A). Weight of advice also
differed as a function of opinion difference, the distance between
a participant’s initial opinion and the advice amount. When
participants experienced a low opinion difference they used advice
more than when they experienced a high opinion difference
(F(1,28) = 6.386, p = 0.017; Figure 2A). Participants also displayed
individual differences in how they utilized advice from experts and
novices (Figure 2B). Some participants used a similar amount of
advice from both expert and novice sources (none used more
novice than expert), while others displayed a greater use of expert
advice compared to novice advice. Importantly, we wanted to
keep performance constant over the course of the experiment and
therefore did not give feedback to participants about the actual
price of the apartments. Indeed, participants did not improve the
accuracy of their opinions; the overall difference between the real
price and participants’ first opinions did not differ between the first
and second half of the experiment (paired t(28) = 0.309, p = 0.759).
We also analyzed participants’ reaction times when utilizing
advice (Figure 2C). Participants responded more quickly when
using expert advice than when using novice advice
(F(1,28) = 24.754, p,0.001). In addition, they took significantly
longer to respond when the opinion difference was low
(F(1,28) = 4.699, p = 0.039).
After the experiment, participants were asked to rate the value
of each type of advice on a Likert scale from 1 to 5, with the higher
number indicating a higher value. The value of the expert advice
was rated as greater than the value of the novice advice (paired
t(28) = 10.217, p,0.001; Figure 2D).
Neuroimaging Results
The value of advice. We hypothesized that the same areas
which represent value and reward expectation when receiving
money and objects, such as the ventral striatum [6], also represent
value when receiving advice. To address this, we analyzed neural
Figure 4. Brain regions demonstrating differential activity due to size of opinion difference upon revealing the advice (Time 2). (A)
When contrasting high opinion difference trials. low opinion difference trials, changes in BOLD signal were greater in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex
and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. (C) When contrasting low opinion difference trials . high opinion difference trials, changes in BOLD signal
were greater in the ventral striatum and the anterior cingulate cortex. (B,D) Parameter estimates in these regions. Bars indicate standard error of the
mean. BOLD activation maps significant at p,0.01, FDR corrected within a priori defined areas (see Materials and Methods). L = left, OD = opinion
difference, OFC = orbitofrontal cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049748.g004
Figure 5. Interaction effect between expertise and size of opinion difference when advice was revealed (Time 2) in left lateral
orbitofrontal cortex. (A) BOLD activity in an interaction contrast ((expert high opinion difference trials . expert low opinion difference trials) .
(novice high opinion difference trials . novice low opinion difference trials)) revealed a significant interaction effect in the left lateral orbitofrontal
cortex. BOLD activation map is significant at p,0.01, FDR corrected within a priori defined areas (see Materials and Methods). (B) Parameter estimates
in the left lateral orbitofrontal cortex. Bars indicate standard error of the mean. (C) The mean activation across all advice trials in this lateral
orbitofrontal region predicts the mean weight of advice over all advice trials for individual participants (Pearson’s r = 0.488, p = 0.007). L = left, OD =
opinion difference.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049748.g005
How Expert Advice Influences Decision Making
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 November 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 11 | e49748
activity when participants discovered that advice would be coming
from an expert or a novice (Time 1). In the expert . novice
contrast participants showed greater blood oxygenation level-
dependent (BOLD) signal changes in the ventral striatum (peak
voxel MNI coordinates: 10, 12,28; max Z= 4.52; p,0.05, cluster
corrected; Figure 3A). See Table 1 for a complete list of brain
regions demonstrating a significant activation in this contrast, and
the novice . expert reverse contrast.
Although not directly relevant to our research question, we also
compared neural activity in the control condition where partic-
ipants found out they would not be receiving advice to the
experimental condition where they found out they would be
receiving advice (main effect of advice across the expert and novice
conditions). See Figure S1 and Table S1 for results.
Expert versus novice advice utilization. To examine brain
activity associated with utilizing advice from sources with different
levels of expertise, we analyzed brain activity when participants
received the advice (Time 2). In the expert . novice contrast
participants showed greater changes in BOLD signal in three
regions (p,0.05, cluster corrected): the medial prefrontal cortex
(0, 50, 22; max Z=4.63; Figure 3B), the left superior parietal
lobule (230, 256, 50; max Z= 3.69; Table 2) and the left inferior
temporal gyrus (252, 248, 214; max Z= 4.07). There were no
significant activations in the novice . expert contrast using the
same strict thresholding procedure.
In addition, we contrasted the control condition where
participants did not receive advice and re-evaluated their opinion
with the experimental condition where participants used advice
(both expert and novice conditions). See Figure S2 and Table S2
for results.
The opinion difference. We hypothesized that the opinion
difference would be represented in previously established reward-
sensitive regions. To address this, we analyzed neural activity
when participants received advice (Time 2) with respect to the size
of the opinion difference. In the high opinion difference . low
opinion difference contrast, three regions displayed a greater
change in BOLD signal (p,0.01, FDR corrected within a priori
defined reward-sensitive areas – see Materials and Methods;
Figure 4A): the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex (right: 46, 36, 216;
max Z= 3.54; left:234, 22,220; max Z= 3.27), the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (6, 40, 218; max Z= 3.68) and the medial
frontal pole (4, 62, 214; max Z=3.59; Table 3). In the low
opinion difference . high opinion difference contrast, there was
a greater change in BOLD signal in four regions (p,0.01, FDR
corrected within a priori defined areas; Figure 4C): the ventral
striatum (10, 16, 28; max Z= 4.69), the anterior cingulate cortex
(22, 22, 42; max Z= 3.58), the bilateral putamen (right: 30, 214,
6; max Z= 3.56; left: 230, 24, 6; max Z= 3.96; Table 3) and the
left lateral orbitofrontal cortex (222, 46, 216; max Z=3.2).
The influence of advice. We tested the hypothesis that
changes in BOLD signal in areas integrating both the expertise
level of the advisor and the opinion difference would correlate with
the behavioral influence of advice. We first computed an
interaction contrast, (expert high opinion difference trials .
expert low opinion difference trials) . (novice high opinion
difference trials . novice low opinion difference trials), when
participants utilized advice (Time 2) to find these integration areas.
This analysis reveals any brain region in which the BOLD signal
change in response to a change in one factor (eg. opinion
difference) depended upon the other factor (eg. expertise level of
the advisor). This analysis revealed a significant interaction effect
in two regions (p,0.01, FDR corrected within a priori defined
areas; Figure 5A and Table 4): the left orbitofrontal cortex (230,
38, 214; max Z= 3.02) and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (0,
Table 1. Significant activation clusters for expertise contrasts




Region x y z Cluster size Peak z
Expert . Novice
L/R Ventral striatum 10 12 28 1478 4.52
R Occipital cortex 16 298 4 1379 6.02
L Occipital cortex 222 2100 4 1368 5.46
Novice . Expert
R Angular gyrus 42 258 20 1058 4.45
L/R Precuneus 10 250 42 686 3.66
Z .2.3, p,0.05, cluster corrected. L, Left; R, Right.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049748.t001
Table 2. Significant activation clusters for expertise contrasts
at Time 2 when participants used advice.
MNI Coordinates
Region x y z Cluster size Peak z
Expert . Novice
L Superior parietal lobule 230 256 50 1710 3.69
L Inferior temporal gyrus 252 248 214 1428 4.07
L/R Paracingulate/Medial PFC 0 50 22 1175 4.63
Novice . Expert
None
Z .2.3, p,0.05, cluster corrected. PFC, prefrontal cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049748.t002
Table 3. Significant activation clusters for opinion difference
contrasts at Time 2 when participants received advice.
MNI
Coordinates
Region x y z Cluster size Peak z
High OD . Low OD
L/R Ventromedial frontal cortex 6 40 218 224 3.68
R Lateral orbitofrontal cortex 46 36 216 208 3.54
L Lateral orbitofrontal cortex 234 22 220 180 3.27
L/R Frontal pole 4 62 214 133 3.59
Low OD . High OD
L/R Anterior cingulate gyrus 22 22 42 1138 3.58
L/R Ventral striatum 10 16 28 638 4.69
L Putamen 230 24 6 269 3.96
R Putamen 30 214 6 206 3.56
L Lateral orbitofrontal cortex 222 46 216 52 3.2
p,0.01, FDR corrected within a priori defined areas (see Materials and
Methods). Clusters .40 voxels. OD, opinion difference.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049748.t003
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56, 222; max Z= 2.85). There were no significant interactions in
the reverse contrast.
We had hypothesized that the activity in areas that demonstrate
an interaction between the expertise level of an advisor and the
opinion difference would correlate with the individual weight of
advice. Thus, for each participant, while they made their second
estimate, we extracted the parameter estimate across all advice
conditions against baseline (expert high opinion difference trials +
expert low opinion difference trials + novice high opinion
difference trials + novice low opinion difference trials)/4 from
the two regions demonstrating the interaction effect. We then
performed a correlation analysis with the parameter estimate and
the mean weight of advice across all trials for each participant.
The changes in activity in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex
correlated with the mean weight of advice across participants
(Pearson’s r = 0.488, p = 0.007; Figure 5C). The changes in activity
in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex did not correlate significantly
with the mean weight of advice (Pearson’s r =20.186, p = 0.333).
To note, there was no correlation between the interaction
parameter estimate and the mean weight of advice across
participants in either the lateral orbitofrontal cortex (Pearson’s
r = 0.103, p = 0.596) or the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(Pearson’s r =20.219, p = 0.253).
Discussion
In the present study, we designed a task to emulate real world
decision making situations where people form an initial opinion,
discover they will be receiving advice (along with the expertise
level of their advisor), receive advice and then adjust their opinion
to make a final decision. To better understand the neurocognitive
processes involved in these types of decisions, we varied the
expertise level of the advisor and ensured that participants
experienced variations in the size of the opinion difference on
a trial-by-trial basis. This resulted in participants exhibiting
a behavioral change that we quantified with the weight of advice
index.
Our behavioral results demonstrate that participants valued
expert advice more than novice advice, as indicated in the post-
experiment questionnaire. Participants used advice from both
groups of advisors, but they used advice from experts more than
advice from novices. This result replicates previous behavioral
research demonstrating that people use more advice when it
comes from experts [2–4]. Before participants received the actual
advice, they also displayed greater changes in BOLD signal in the
ventral striatum when they discovered that they would be
receiving expert advice compared to novice advice. This result
agrees with previous research demonstrating that activity in the
ventral striatum tracks value through reward anticipation
[6,26,27]. People may value expert advice more because they
believe it will enable them to make better decisions with higher
value outcomes, even before they receive a specific recommenda-
tion. Brain activity at the time of the utilization of expert and
novice advice supports this view. Participants demonstrated
greater increases in BOLD signal in the medial prefrontal cortex
when utilizing expert advice. This result is in line with previous
research demonstrating that activity in this region positively
correlates with the value of a chosen option when choosing
between options; the higher the expected value of the choice, the
higher the activity [28–31].
We theorized that the distance between a person’s initial
opinion and the advisor’s opinion would affect advice utilization.
Our behavioral results demonstrate that participants used advice
more when the distance between their first estimate and the advice
was low. A recent behavioral study which asked people to estimate
historical dates, such as the year the Suez Canal first opened, while
either receiving or not receiving advice, found the same result [8].
To note, the size of the difference in the weight of advice index
between the high and low opinion difference conditions in this
study was comparable to our study, 0.08 and 0.07, respectively (in
both studies the differences are small yet significant). Our
neuroimaging results show that the opinion difference is repre-
sented in brain regions previously indicated to be involved in
reward processing. When the opinion difference was high, an
increased BOLD signal was observed in the lateral orbitofrontal
cortex and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. When the opinion
difference was low, an increased BOLD signal was observed in the
ventral striatum and the anterior cingulate cortex. In low opinion
difference trials participants found out that someone else’s opinion
was similar to their own. In other studies the ventral striatum has
also been shown to be more active when people found out
another’s opinion was similar to their own [15,16]. With the
ventral striatum being firmly established as a reward-related brain
area [32], it is possible that people experience a reward when they
find out that their opinion is close to an advisor’s opinion, i.e.
when a person agrees with them.
With respect to our anterior cingulate cortex result, it has been
well documented that this area is involved in computing rewards
during behavioral tasks [10]. Similar to the ventral striatum, our
finding that anterior cingulate cortex is more active in low opinion
difference trials can be interpreted with regard to this reward
literature, although it may be somewhat surprising when
considering its role in other previous literature on conflict
monitoring and cognitive control [33,34]. Importantly, our
reaction time data show that participants took longer to respond
when their initial opinion was close to the advisor’s estimate. This
difference was small yet significant. We theorize that when the
Table 4. Significant activation clusters for opinion difference interaction contrasts at Time 2 when participants received advice.
MNI Coordinates
Region x y z Cluster size Peak z
(Expert high OD . Expert low OD) . (Novice high OD . Novice low OD)
L/R Ventromedial frontal cortex 0 56 222 49 2.85
L/R Lateral orbitofrontal cortex 230 38 214 48 3.02
(Expert low OD . Expert high OD) . (Novice low OD . Novice high OD)
None
p,0.01, FDR corrected within a priori defined areas (see Materials and Methods). Clusters .40 voxels. OD, opinion difference.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049748.t004
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opinion difference is low, a slightly more ‘‘fine-grained’’ estimation
ensues resulting in a slightly longer reaction time. Alternatively, it
could be that the participants are choosing between two options,
their first opinion versus the advice, and in the low opinion
difference condition, the two options are closer together and thus
present a slightly more difficult decision (although previous
behavioral research shows that people who receive advice tend
to average opinions rather than choose between an initial opinion
and an advisor’s [35]). Either way, our reaction time data suggest
a greater amount of information processing when encountering
low opinion differences and agrees with the previous literature on
the role of the anterior cingulate cortex [33,34,36–38].
We identified a brain region that represents the behavioral
influence of advice by requiring that this region fulfill two
conditions. First, when the participant utilizes advice, the expertise
of the advisor and the size of the opinion difference should interact
in this area. Second, the activity in this region should correlate
with individual differences in advice utilization across participants.
We found that activity in the left lateral orbitofrontal cortex
fulfilled these requirements. Specifically, we observed this corre-
lation with the average parameter estimate across all advice
conditions against baseline. Thus, our data demonstrate that,
across individuals, the greater the average BOLD signal change in
the left lateral orbitofrontal cortex during decision making, the
greater the influence of advice.
Similar to the present study on explicit advice, certain types of
implicit influence by celebrities or group opinion have previously
been investigated. For example, activity in the anterior cingulate
cortex was demonstrated to correlate with the perceived degree of
expertise a celebrity has regarding a product [18]. It was shown
that the next day after viewing a celebrity paired with a product,
the greater the perceived expertise of the celebrity, the greater the
intention to purchase the product and the greater the memory for
the product. This study provided evidence for the implicit
influence of expertise on decision making, and although in the
present study we focused on the explicit influence of expertise, our
results agree with their behavioral findings, showing that people
are more influenced by individuals whom they perceive to have
more expertise. Furthermore, conformity to group opinion has
previously been shown to recruit the intraparietal sulcus,
temporoparietal junction, insular cortex, anterior cingulate,
ventral striatum and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex [15–
17,39,40]. Importantly, in the most recent study by Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., behavioral conformity was correlated with brain
structure to reveal a peak voxel in the left lateral orbitofrontal
cortex (233, 28, 216) that is very near to the peak voxel revealed
by our functional interaction contrast (230, 38, 214). Thus, our
results concerning advice utilization, taken together with this
recent publication on conformity, strongly suggest a role for the
lateral orbitofrontal cortex in the computation of social influence.
Previous neuroimaging research has investigated aspects of
advice taking that are different from the present study. Neural
correlates for receiving advice, compared to not receiving advice,
have been demonstrated in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and
the temporoparietal junction [13]. Furthermore, when making
repeated decisions with the same advisor and receiving feedback
on decision outcomes, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the
temporoparietal junction are active during the outcome period
[12]. In this second study, these regions computed a social
prediction error allowing a person to learn the trustworthiness of
their advisor. Finally, it has been demonstrated that the septal area
implements an ‘‘outcome-bonus’’ signal upon receiving feedback
after choices made under the influence of advice [14]. The septal
area demonstrated a greater signal change after both positive and
negative feedback from recommended choices compared to non-
recommended choices. The current study did not demonstrate
involvement of similar brain regions. However, this is not
surprising because we focused on the differences between using
expert and novice advice, and not the differences between making
decisions with or without advice. Furthermore, we investigated
brain activity at the time participants received advice and related it
to behavioral change via the weight of advice index. Examining
brain activity at the time we receive and utilize advice and relating
it to the behavioral change caused by the advice is crucial to
understanding how we integrate advice into the decision making
process.
In conclusion, with the present report, we demonstrate how
people use advice when making decisions. We show that advice-
taking consists of three neurocognitive processes: the valuation of
advice, the assessment of the opinion difference, and the process of
combining valuation and the opinion difference resulting in actual
advice utilization. This last process was shown to occur in the left
lateral orbitofrontal cortex, where the average activity correlates
with the mean use of advice across participants. This result
establishes the lateral orbitofrontal cortex as a region of the brain
responsible for the behavioral influence of advice. As a whole, our
findings provide neural evidence for how advice engenders
behavioral change during the decision making process, and
advance the overall understanding of how humans use advice.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Brain regions showing a main effect between
the advice and no advice conditions when participants
discovered whom their advisor will be (Time 1). Advice
includes both the expert and novice conditions. (A) When
contrasting advice . no advice, participants showed greater
changes in BOLD signal in the ventral striatum and medial
prefrontal cortex. (B) When contrasting no advice . advice,
participants showed greater changes in BOLD signal in the right
caudate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. BOLD activation maps
thresholded at Z .3.7, p,0.05, cluster corrected. L= left.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Brain regions showing a main effect between
the advice and no advice conditions when participants
received advice (Time 2). Advice includes both the expert and
novice conditions. (A) When contrasting advice . no advice,
participants showed greater changes in BOLD signal in the
caudate and intraparietal sulcus. (B) When contrasting no advice
. advice, participants showed greater changes in BOLD signal in
the insula and inferior parietal lobule. BOLD activation maps
thresholded at Z .3.7, P,0.05, cluster corrected. L= left.
(TIF)
Table S1 Significant activation clusters at Time 1 when
participants discovered if they would be receiving advice
(expert & novice) or not receiving advice. Z .3.7, p,0.05,
cluster corrected. L, Left; R, Right; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex.
(DOCX)
Table S2 Significant activation clusters at Time 2 when
participants either received advice (expert & novice) or
did not receive advice and re-evaluated their opinion. Z
.3.7, p,0.05, cluster corrected.
(DOCX)
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